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Abstract
We study fair and e¢ cient tax-benet schemes based on income and non-income
factors under partial control. Partial control means that each factor is a specic
mixture of unobserved ability (randomly drawn by nature) and e¤ort (chosen by
individuals who di¤er in tastes). Factors di¤er in the degree of control, ranging from
no control (if only ability matters) to full control (if only e¤ort matters). Fairness
requires to compensate individuals for di¤erences in well-being caused by di¤erences
in abilities, while at the same time preserving well-being di¤erences caused by taste
di¤erences. We discuss rst the general properties of fair and e¢ cient tax-benet
schemes. Next, we study two special cases income taxation and tagging in detail.
Finally, we derive testable conditions for the general case and discuss the empirical
implementation.
JEL codes: D6, H2, I3
Keywords: fairness, redistribution, taxation, tagging, equality of opportunity.
We would like to thank Martin Cripps, the editor, and two anonymous referees as well as Spencer
Bastani, Koen Decancq, André Decoster, Clemens Fuest, Laura Kalambokidis, Dirk Neumann, An-
drew Oswald, Jukka Pirttilä, Jim Poterba, John Roemer, Erik Schokkaert, Alain Trannoy, Andreas
Wagener, participants at seminars in Barcelona (UAB), Bonn (IZA), Louvain-La-Neuve (CORE), Man-
nheim (ZEW), Munich (CESifo), and participants at conferences in Chicago (NTA), Marseille (LAGV),
Sankt Gallen (IARIW), and Uppsala (IIPF) for helpful comments and suggestions.
yErwin Ooghe, Department of Economics (KULeuven) and IZA; e-mail to erwin.ooghe@kuleuven.be.
Andreas Peichl, ZEW, University of Mannheim and IZA; e-mail to peichl@zew.de.
1
1 Introduction
Economists traditionally assume that individuals are motivated only by their material
self-interest. But experiments systematically reject the pure self-interest hypothesis;
see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a survey. Other considerations, like fairness, do
play a role. If earnings are a combination of brute luck (drawn by nature) and e¤ort
(chosen by the individual), then people are willing to compensate others for unlucky
draws by nature, but also allow them to enjoy the fruits of their e¤ort. Empirical
evidence shows that the more income is determined by luck, the more redistribution is
preferred. Konow (2003), Alesina and Giuliano (2010), and Gaertner and Schokkaert
(2011) provide overviews based on laboratory experiments, social survey data, and struc-
tured questionnaires.
Fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy models. Alesina et
al. (2001) show that di¤erent beliefs about the importance of luck for income acquisition
can help explain the divergence in redistribution levels in di¤erent democratic societies.
The political economy models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Bénabou
and Tirole (2006), and Alesina et al. (2012) lead to multiple states such that stronger
beliefs in the role of e¤ort coincide with lower levels of redistribution.1
Similar notions of fairness have been introduced in the so-called fair income tax liter-
ature. Some authors start from a specic fairness notion, derive the corresponding social
ordering, and characterise or simulate optimal income tax schemes; see, e.g., Roemer et
al. (2003), Schokkaert et al. (2004), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007), Luttens and
Ooghe (2007), Jacquet and Van de gaer (2011), and Aaberge and Colombino (2012).
Other authors study the consequences of introducing preference heterogeneity directly
in the optimal (utilitarian) income tax literature; see, Boadway et al. (2002), Kaplow
(2008), Choné and Laroque (2010), and Lockwood and Weinzierl (2012). Contrary to
Mirrlees (1971), negative marginal income taxes subsidies to the hard-working poor
may be optimal.
Political economy models and fair income tax models traditionally focus on earn-
ings only. There exist, however, di¤erent theoretical reasons to include also non-income
information in the tax base. If externalities exist, then there is a role for government
to subsidise or tax these activities à la Pigou (1920) to restore e¢ ciency. If there exist
tags observable, usually exogenous factors that correlate with unobserved abilities or
1See also the comment on Alesina and Angeletos (2005) by Di Tella and Dubra (2013) and the reply
by Alesina et al. (2013).
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tastes then di¤erentiating the tax-benet system on the basis of these tags (sometimes
called tagging) can also enhance e¢ ciency; see Akerlof (1978) for his seminal contri-
bution.2 The optimal income tax treatment of family size and couples also received
considerable attention; see, e.g., Mirrlees (1972) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) for
initial contributions.3
In this paper, we study the design of fair and e¢ cient tax-benet schemes based on
income and non-income factors under partial control. We preview the core ingredients.
Individuals di¤er in unobserved abilities and tastes.4 Taste di¤erences bring the
question of fairness which inequalities are justiable and which are not to the fore.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) propose to keep individuals responsible for their tastes,
but to compensate them for di¤erences in their abilities. Responsibility for tastes de-
mands that the laisser-faire should result if all individuals have the same ability. In
this case, di¤erences in outcomes can only be caused by di¤erences in tastes for which
they were kept responsible. Compensation for abilities requires to approve of transfers
from better o¤ to worse o¤ if these di¤erences in income are caused only by di¤erences
in abilities (i.e., if they have the same preferences and exert the same e¤ort). We use
a classical welfare function a sum of transformed utilities that satises the Pareto
principle, compensation, and responsibility.
Besides income, we also model non-income factors. Both income and non-income
factors are modelled as a convex combination of ability (drawn by nature) and e¤ort
(chosen by individuals who di¤er in tastes). The weight denes the degree of control.
For some factors, think of an inborn handicap, the degree of control is zero, while other
factors, think of earnings or family composition, the degree of control is positive and
partial control applies.
The complexity of the resulting multidimensional screening exercise forces us to sim-
plify several aspects of the model to keep analytical tractability. Besides a linear produc-
tion technology under partial control, we assume quasi-linear preferences (dened over
2Tagging has also been analysed by, among others, Immonen et al. (1998) and Salanié (2002, 2003).
While these authors do not have a specic tag in mind, Blomquist and Micheletto (2008), Bastani et
al. (2013), and Weinzierl (2011) consider age tags, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) study height, and
Cremer et al. (2010) and Alesina et al. (2011) focus on gender.
3See, e.g., Cremer et al. (2003, 2012), Schroyen (2003), Brett (2007), Kleven et al. (2009) and
Immervoll et al. (2011) for a recent state-of-the-art.
4The standard optimal income tax literature is traditionally based on ability heterogeneity only; see
recent surveys by Mankiw et al. (2009), Diamond and Saez (2011), Boadway (2012), and Piketty and
Saez (2013).
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income, non-income factors, and e¤ort), independent multivariate normal distributions
for abilities and tastes, and linear tax rates for the income and non-income factors.
Our results show that, in general, optimal tax rates balance the marginal e¢ ciency
cost of taxation caused by tax distortions against the marginal net fairness benet of
taxation. The latter is the di¤erence between the marginal compensation benet and
the marginal responsibility cost of taxation. Higher taxes reduce outcome di¤erences
between individuals with the same tastes, but di¤erent abilities a good thing reected
by the marginal compensation benet of taxation. Yet, higher taxes also reduce the
outcome di¤erences between individuals with the same abilities, but di¤erent tastes a
bad thing captured by the marginal responsibility cost of taxation.
We also study two special cases in detail. In case only income is included in the model,
we show, among other things, that the optimal income tax negatively depends on the
degree of control over income. The tax must also increase with ability heterogeneity,
while it has to decrease with taste heterogeneity. If we add a tag to the model
an observable non-controllable non-income factor, say, an inborn handicap , then the
optimal tax on the tag depends on the correlation between the tag and the unobserved
ability to earn income. Introducing taste heterogeneity and tagging lowers the optimal
tax on income.
Finally, we show how the theory can be tested empirically. We derive testable
conditions for the tax rates on non-controllable factors in the general case. They turn
out to be equal to the sum of the direct e¤ects of non-controllable factors on well-
being augmented by their indirect e¤ects via the correlation with partially controllable
factors. We also discuss how the theory can be empirically tested using happiness data.
We show that in this case, the theory obtains a simple structure that resembles equality
of opportunity regressions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 discusses the main result. Section 4 and 5 study two special cases income
taxation and tagging in detail. Section 6 returns to the general case and derives testable
conditions. Section 7 concludes.
4
2 The model
We dene the basic building blocks preferences and constraints at the individual and
the societal level.5
2.1 Individual preferences and constraints
Individual utility U(c; x; e) is a function of consumption c 2 R, non-income factors
x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xJ) 2 RJ , and e¤ort e = (e0; e1; : : : ; eJ) 2 RJ+1. Consumption c equals
gross income y minus taxes (y; x), a function of gross income and non-income factors.
A production function f : RJ+1 ! RJ+1 maps e¤ort e into gross income and non-income
factors (y; x).
The utility maximising problem of an individual can be summarised as
max
e
U(c; x; e) subject to c  y   (y; x) and (y; x) = f(e):
To keep the model tractable, we make the following simplifying assumptions.
1. Quasi-linear preferences. Utility is equal to consumption plus the value of non-
income factors minus the cost of e¤ort, or
U (c; x; e) = c+ g(x)  h(e):
This specication is quasi-linear in consumption, as in Diamond (1998), and ex-
cludes therefore income e¤ects.6 In addition, the value function of non-income
factors g and the cost function of e¤ort h have a exible parameterisation, more
precisely,
g(x) =
PJ
j=1 jxj ,
h(e) =
PJ
j=0
j
exp j
exp(
ej
j
):
The vector  captures the trade-o¤ between income and non-income factors in a
simple linear way, so it extends quasi-linearity to the non-income factors. Without
loss of generality we assume the non-income factors to be desirable, i.e.,  2 RJ++.
The vector  2 RJ+1 is a taste vector, dening the disutility of e¤ort. Higher values
5We present an additive version of the model here. The appendix in Ooghe and Peichl (2010) contains
a multiplicative variant with the same results.
6Zero income e¤ects are often not falsied by the data; see, e.g., the discussion in Diamond and Saez
(2011) or Piketty and Saez (2013) as well as the results in Bargain et al. (2014).
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for  correspond with lower disutilities of e¤ort, thus more ambitious individuals.
The vector  2 RJ+1++ is an elasticity vector that controls the convexity of h. Higher
values for  correspond with more elastic responses to e¤ort and thus a higher cost
of taxation.
2. Linear production. Gross income y and the non-income factors in x are under
partial control, i.e., they are each a convex combination of e¤ort and ability. We
dene
y = 0e0 + (1  0) 0;
xj = jej + (1  j) j for j = 1; 2; : : : ; J;
with  2 (0; 1)J+1 collecting the weights and  2 RJ+1 the abilities. The weights
dene the degree of control of a factor, ranging from no control (j ! 0; the factor
is ability only) over partial control (0 < j < 1) to full control (j ! 1; the factor
is e¤ort only).
3. Ability and taste heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in abilities is modelled via
heterogeneity in the vector . In particular, we assume a multivariate normal dis-
tribution, with  = (0; 

1; : : : ; 

J) the vector of means and 
 = [jk] the
variance-covariance matrix, with jk = Ef(j   j)(k   k)g.7 To model het-
erogeneity in tastes, we assume that the taste vector  also follows a multivariate
normal distribution, fully described by  and  . Note that abilities and tastes
are assumed to be independently distributed.8 This assumption avoids the philo-
sophical problem whether we can keep individuals responsible for their tastes, if
the latter correlate with abilities. Still, independence between abilities and tastes
does not exclude that income and the non-income factors are correlated in complex
ways. We will come back to this issue in detail in section 6.
Individuals know their abilities and tastes when choosing e¤ort.9 Let e( ; ; )
be the utility maximising e¤ort choice and c( ; ; ), y( ; ; ), and x( ; ; ) the
corresponding (net and gross) income and the non-income factors.
7We exclude perfect correlation, so (jk)
2 < jj

kk for j 6= k.
8Whereas abilities  and tastes  are heterogeneous, the degrees of control , the parameters in ,
and the elasticities  are the same for all individuals.
9The e¤ort choice would remain the same if individuals were expected utility maximisers that know
their tastes, but only the distribution of abilities. Abilities can thus also be interpreted as risks.
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2.2 Social preference and constraint
The social preference and its owner, the ctitious social planner, are a proxy for a more
complex political voting model.10 The problem of the planner is to choose a tax scheme
 to maximise welfare subject to a budget constraint. Let R0 denote an exogenous
(per-capita) revenue requirement; the social planners problem is
max

W () subject to R()  R0;
withW the welfare function and R the revenue function. The revenue function measures
the average tax revenue, so R() =
R

R
(y
( ; ; ); x( ; ; ))dF () dG (), with F
and G the distribution functions of abilities and tastes. We make again some additional
simplifying assumptions.
1. Welfare. Welfare is a sum of transformed well-being levels, more precisely
W () =  1[
R

R
(v( ; ; ))dF ()dG()];
with  a strictly increasing transformation function and v( ; ; ) the well-being
level of an individual (explained in the next item). The transformation function
 is chosen to be exponential, i.e.,  : x 7! exp( rx), with r > 0 the degree
of inequality aversion. This leads to a Kolm-Pollak welfare function in between
utilitarianism (r ! 0) and maximin (r ! +1).
2. Well-being. Inspired by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and for reasons that
will be explained below the well-being function v is chosen to be a specic car-
dinalisation of the indirect utility function V . Indirect utility is dened as
V ( ; ; ) = U(c( ; ; ); x( ; ; ); e( ; ; ));
and well-being bv = v( ; ; ) is implicitly dened by the equation
V ( ; ; ) = V (R0; (bv; bv; : : : ; bv); ):
In words, bv = v( ; ; ) is the ability level that makes an individual indi¤erent
between his actual situation, with utility level V ( ; ; ), and the following hypo-
thetical situation:11
10Mueller (2003) shows the equivalence between a planner with a weighted utilitarian welfare function
and a probabilistic voting model with two candidates that compete for votes. In the current context,
Alesina et al. (2012) and Alesina et al. (2013) use probabilistic voting models to analyse fairness and
redistribution.
11 In the appendix we show that bv is well-dened and unique under the assumptions made.
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(a) the tax is lump-sum and satises the revenue constraint, so,  = R0,
(b) the individual has a hypothetical ability type equal to (bv; bv; : : : ; bv),
(c) the individual keeps his own preferences parameterised by .
3. Linear taxation. Taxation is linear, i.e.,
(y; x) = T + t0y +
PJ
j=1 tjxj ;
with T 2 R the demogrant and t = (t0; t1; : : : ; tJ) 2 RJ+1 the tax rates that apply
to income and the non-income factors. Linearity is restrictive, but it is nonetheless
a good approximation of existing tax-benet schemes.12
We illustrate and justify the construction of well-being as a specic cardinalisation
of indirect utility. Figure 1 illustrates the construction of well-being in case only income
matters; the tax is a general function of income and denoted by (y) in the absence of
non-income factors.
Figure 1: Well-being in the absence of non-income factors
6
-
c
e0
(1  0)bv  R0 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
p p
r 2 r
by  R01 r
y   (y)
Bundle 1 is the actual choice from the budget set c  y   (y) for some arbitrary tax
scheme  . Bundle 2 is the hypothetical choice from the budget set c  by R0, with by the
hypothetical gross income dened as by = 0e0 + (1  0)bv, and bv chosen such that the
individual is indi¤erent between the actual and hypothetical choice. The well-being level
12The total variation in net tax payments in Europe and the United States can be linearly explained
by non-income factors (49% on average) and income (30%), while higher-order terms for income do
not seem to play an important role (5%). The remaining part is either unexplained (12%) or reects
covariances between the observed characteristics (4%); see Ooghe and Peichl (2010) for details.
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bv can be read up to an a¢ ne transformation at the intersection of the hypothetical
budget line and the vertical axis.
The social ranking of tax schemes results as an inextricable combination of a specic
welfare and well-being function. In line with Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006), it satises
the Pareto principle and two fairness principles, responsibility and compensation. We
provide an informal discussion of the properties here; a formal statement can be found
in the appendix.
The Pareto principle guarantees that the social planner will select only Pareto ef-
cient tax schemes, i.e., in the optimal tax scheme no one can be made strictly better
o¤ without making some other people strictly worse o¤. Responsibility and compensa-
tion implement the fairness idea that keeps individuals responsible for their tastes, but
compensates them for di¤erences in abilities. Responsibility requires the laisser-faire
( = R0) to be optimal in case all individuals have the same abilities. In this peculiar
case, di¤erences between individuals are entirely driven by di¤erences in tastes; and if
individuals are responsible for their tastes, then there is indeed no reason for redistribu-
tion. The compensation principle approves of income transfers from the better o¤ to the
worse o¤ in case two individuals have the same tastes. In this specic case, di¤erences
in outcomes between both individuals can be traced back to di¤erences in their abilities
only; and if they are not responsible for their abilities, then income redistribution is
justied.
3 Main result
Proposition 1 characterises the general solution; all proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. The optimal tax rate vector t = (t0; t1; : : : ; tJ) must satisfy the rst-
order conditions
  jj tj
j   tj| {z }
e¢ ciency cost
= r  f(1  j)
PJ
k=0(k   tk)(1  k)kj| {z }
compensation benet
  jj
PJ
k=0 tkkk

kj| {z }
responsibility cost
g;
for j = 0; 1; : : : ; J , with 0  1 and  
PJ
j=0 (1  j)j > 0.
The left-hand side of each rst-order condition is up to the scale factor  the
marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation caused by tax distortions. The inequality aversion
parameter r plays indeed no role here. The marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation ap-
proaches zero if the taxed factor cannot be changed by e¤ort (j ! 0), if the factor is
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inelastically provided (j ! 0), or if the tax rate is equal to zero (tj ! 0). It becomes
innitely large if the tax rate conscates the complete value of a factor (tj ! j). As a
consequence we have tj < j at the optimum, for all j = 0; 1; : : : ; J .
The right-hand side is the net marginal fairness benet of taxation (the term between
curly brackets) weighted by the inequality aversion parameter r. If society cares only
about e¢ ciency (r ! 0), then taxation only causes distortions and the optimal linear
tax scheme, denoted (T ; t), must coincide with the laisser-faire tax scheme (R0; 0).
The net marginal fairness benet of taxation is equal to the marginal compensation
benet of taxation minus the marginal responsibility cost. The rst term between curly
brackets is the marginal compensation benet of taxation. It reects the fact that higher
taxes reduce outcome di¤erences between people with the same tastes, but di¤erent
abilities. Viewed in this way, taxation compensates individuals for ability di¤erences,
and thus increases welfare. The marginal compensation benet depends on the degrees
of control and on the variance-covariance structure of abilities.
The second term between curly brackets is the marginal responsibility cost of tax-
ation. Higher taxes also reduce outcome di¤erences between people with the same
abilities, but di¤erent tastes. Viewed from this angle, taxation goes against responsibil-
ity and thus decreases welfare. The responsibility term therefore enters as a cost. The
marginal responsibility cost depends on the degrees of control, the elasticities, and the
variance-covariance structure of tastes.
The marginal compensation benet of taxation is equal to zero if there is no ability
heterogeneity ( ! 0). If everyone has the same ability, then taxation only causes
costs e¢ ciency and responsibility costs and the laisser-faire will be optimal, as re-
quired indeed by the responsibility principle. The marginal responsibility cost of tax-
ation becomes zero if there is no taste heterogeneity ( ! 0). So, if everyone has
the same tastes, then the tax rates must balance the e¢ ciency costs and the weighted
compensation benets.
To get more insight in the optimal tax structure, and to compare it with the existing
literature, we focus next on two special cases. Section 4 starts with the simplest case
possible: only income and no non-income factors. Afterwards, we add an exogenous tag
to income in section 5.
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4 Income only
We start with the simplest case possible: only income matters. The case is similar to
Sheshinski (1972), but recall that agents di¤er in both abilities and tastes here. The
system of rst-order conditions of proposition 1 reduces to
(1  0)00 t0
1  t0 = rf(1  0)
2 (1  t0)00   (00)2 t000g: (1)
Responsibility for tastes implies that taxation has a responsibility cost. The optimal
income tax rate will therefore be smaller in the presence of taste heterogeneity compared
to models with heterogeneity in abilities only. Still, some of the classical comparative
statics remain unchanged; see, e.g., Piketty and Saez (2013). In particular, the optimal
income tax rate lies between 0 and 1, decreases with the elasticity of e¤ort 0, and
increases with inequality aversion r.
Fairness requires a higher sensitivity to ability di¤erences compared to taste di¤er-
ences. The source of heterogeneity therefore plays a role for the optimal income tax rate.
More ability heterogeneity 00 leads to higher income taxes, while more taste heterogen-
eity 00 implies lower taxes. The latter e¤ect also occurs in Lockwood and Weinzierls
(2012) most plausible specication. Both results can also be combined to state that the
optimal income tax rate must increase with the signal-to-noise ratio 00=

00 (in case
numerator and denominator change in opposite ways). The signal-to-noise ratio plays a
similar role in the political economy model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and in the
optimal tax model of Su and Judd (2006).
More control a higher 0 implies a lower income tax rate. To the best of our
knowledge, this result is new in optimal tax models. It mirrors the political economy
equilibria of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), and Bénabou and Tirole
(2006) where a higher belief in control coincides with a lower tax rate.
Proposition 2 summarises the di¤erent theoretical results.
Proposition 2. The optimal tax rate t0 on income
1. lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t0 < 1;
2. decreases with the elasticity of e¤ort 0, from complete taxation in the case of
perfectly inelastic e¤ort (t0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no taxation in the case of perfectly
elastic e¤ort (t0 ! 0 if 0 ! +1);
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3. increases with the inequality aversion r, from no taxation if the planner is inequal-
ity neutral (t0 ! 0 if r ! 0) to partial taxation if the planner only cares about
inequality (0 < t0 < 1 if r ! +1);
4. increases with ability heterogeneity 00, from no taxation if everyone has the same
ability (t0 ! 0 if 00 ! 0) to complete taxation if ability becomes extremely
heterogeneous (t0 ! 1 if 00 ! +1);
5. decreases with taste heterogeneity 00, from partial taxation if everyone has the
same taste (0 < t0 < 1 if 

00 ! 0) to zero taxation if taste becomes extremely
heterogeneous (t0 ! 0 if 00 ! +1);
6. decreases with the degree of control 0, from complete taxation if income cannot
be controlled (t0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no taxation if income is fully controlled (t0 ! 0
if 0 ! 1).
5 Adding a tag
Suppose that, in addition to income, there is also a tag, an observable non-controllable
non-income factor, as in Akerlof (1978). The tag inuences well-being directly as a non-
income factor, but, in addition, it may also correlate with and thus signal unobserved
earnings ability. Taxing or subsidising the tag has therefore two potential e¤ects. It may
reduce well-being di¤erences that are directly caused by the tag (via 1). In addition, it
may also help reduce di¤erences in well-being caused by di¤erences in earnings ability
because the tag is correlated with earnings ability (via 10). The latter is called tagging.
It has no e¢ ciency cost (the tag is non-controllable), but it is imperfect (the tag is not
a perfect signal of earnings ability).
In case of income and a single tag, the system of rst-order conditions reduces to
00t0
1  t0 = rf(1  0) ((1  t0) (1  0)

00 + (1   t1)10)  (00)2 t000g; (2)
0 = (1  t0) (1  0)01 + (1   t1)11; (3)
with  = (1  0) + 1 here.
5.1 The tax on income in the presence of a tag
In the previous section, the optimal income tax rate t0 turned out to be smaller in the
presence of taste heterogeneity. We explain why it will be even smaller in the presence of
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a tag. If there is neither a direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being (1 ! 0) nor an indirect
signalling e¤ect (01 ! 0), then equation (3) tells us that taxing or subsidising the tag
makes no sense (i.e., t1 ! 0 is optimal). In this case, equation (2) reduces to equation
(1) and the optimal income tax rates must coincide. In addition, the comparative statics
tell us that the optimal income tax rate (in the presence of a tag) decreases with the
direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being (1) and with the absolute value of the covariance
between the tag and earnings ability (j01j). Combining both results, the optimal tax
rate on income will be lower in the presence of a tag.
Although the optimal tax rate on income t0 will be generically lower compared to the
previous section, the comparative statics in proposition 2 remain valid. In addition, the
correlation between the tag and unobserved earnings ability plays an interesting role.
In the limiting cases of perfect correlation ((01)
2 ! 0011), the tax rate on income t0
reduces to zero and all taxation can be done via t1, the tax on the tag. This stands to
reason because in these cases the tag is a perfect signal of unobserved earnings ability
and, being non-controllable, it is a superior tax base as it can be taxed without e¢ ciency
cost. Finally, the optimal tax rate on income t0 increases with the variance of the tag
11. If the tag becomes more noisy, tagging becomes less interesting relative to taxing
income, and the income tax rate therefore increases.
Proposition 3 collects the di¤erent results for the optimal tax rate on income in the
presence of a tag.
Proposition 3. The optimal tax rate t0 on income in the presence of a tag
1. satises all properties of proposition 2;
2. decreases with the direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being 1;
3. follows an inverse U-shaped pattern with respect to the covariance between the
tag and earnings ability 01, starting and ending at no taxation in case of perfect
correlation (t0 ! 0 if (01)2 ! 0011) and reaching a maximum in case of no
correlation (01 = 0);
4. increases with the variance of the tag 11.
5.2 The tax on the tag
The second rst-order condition can be rewritten as
t1 = 1 + (1  t0)(1  0)01=11: (4)
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The right-hand side consists of two parts, one dealing with the direct e¤ect of the
tag and the other with the indirect signalling e¤ect. In the absence of a signalling
e¤ect (01 ! 0), the optimal (read: fair) tax on the tag is equal to 1, i.e., the direct
e¤ect of the tag should be fully taxed away. In the absence of a direct e¤ect of the
tag on well-being (1 ! 0), the optimal (read: e¢ cient) tax on the tag reduces to
t1 = (1  t0)(1  0)01=11. Because 1  t0 > 0 in the optimum (proposition 2, point
1 and proposition 3, point 1), the tax on the tag will be positive (negative) if the tag
signals a higher (lower) unobserved ability to earn.
To discuss the comparative statics for t1, the tax on the tag, we assume without loss
of generality a positive correlation between the tag and unobserved earnings ability.
A higher cost of income taxation 0, less heterogeneity in earnings ability 00, or more
heterogeneity in tastes for earnings e¤ort 00 implies that using an income tax becomes
relatively less interesting compared to tagging. The tax on the tag will therefore be
higher in these cases. The higher the inequality aversion r, the lower the tax on the tag.
Although counterintuitive at rst sight, recall that the inequality aversion only a¤ects
the tax on the tag via the tax t0 on income in equation (4). A higher inequality aversion
leads to a higher income tax that in turn reduces the indirect e¤ect of the tag on well-
being via net income. The e¤ect of control on tagging is not clear a priori. Proposition
2 (point 6) and proposition 3 (point 1) tell us only that in the extreme cases of no
control and full control the term (1   t0)(1   0) in equation (4) is equal to zero. The
tax on the tag must then be equal to 1. Finally, the tax on the tag will be higher, the
higher the signalling value of the tag for unobserved ability 01 and the lower the noise
of the tag, measured by its variance 11. So, the tax on the tag will be higher the higher
the signal-to-noise ratio 01=

11 (in case numerator and denominator move in opposite
ways).
Proposition 4 summarises the comparative statics for t1.
Proposition 4. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag
1. will be larger (resp. smaller) than 1, if the covariance 

01 is positive (resp. neg-
ative);
2. increases (resp. decreases) with the income elasticity 0 if the covariance 01 is
positive (resp. negative);
3. decreases (resp. increases) with ability heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covari-
ance 01 is positive (resp. negative);
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4. increases (resp. decreases) with taste heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covari-
ance 01 is positive (resp. negative);
5. decreases (resp. increases) with the inequality aversion r if the covariance 01 is
positive (resp. negative);
6. is equal to 1 if there is no control over income and if there is full control over
income (t1 ! 1, if either 0 ! 0 or 0 ! 1); the change of the tax rate with
control is undened in general;13
7. increases with the covariance 01;
8. decreases (resp. increases) with 11 if the covariance 

01 is positive (resp. negative).
6 Testable conditions
To set the stage, notice that equation (4) is not testable: we do not observe the degree
of control 0 and the covariance between the tag and unobserved earnings ability 01.
The covariance between the tag x1 = 1 and gross income y is observable however, and,
using equation (17) of the appendix, it can be written as
cov(x1; y) = (1  0)01. (5)
Equation (4) then becomes
t1 = 1 + (1  t0) cov(x1; y)=cov(x1; x1). (6)
All terms are observable in principle. Suppose for example that the tag is physical
ability. The tax rates t0 and t1 reect the tax rate on earnings and invalidity/health
benets. The term 1 is the willingness to pay for physical ability the marginal rate of
substitution between net income and physical ability. It can be estimated if one is willing
to use happiness data as a proxy for well-being; see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Schokkaert
(2012).14 The covariance cov(x1; y) between physical ability and gross income and the
variance of physical ability cov(x1; x1) can be easily estimated. In particular, the ratio
13Simulations suggest that t1 typically follows an inverse U-shaped (resp. U-shaped) pattern with
respect to the degree of control if the covariance is positive (resp. negative).
14 It has been argued that using self-reported happiness or subjective well-being data gives the re-
searcher direct information on individual well-being and it is not necessary to rely on revealed preferences
or estimated individual utilities; see, e.g., the survey by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006).
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cov(x1; y)=cov(x1; x1) is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the slope when
regressing income y on physical ability x1. Equation (6) tells us that the tax rate on the
tag should be equal to the direct e¤ect of physical ability on well-being augmented by
the indirect e¤ect of physical ability on well-being via its expected e¤ect on net income.
In the remainder of this section, we generalise equation (6) to allow for several non-
income factors. Afterwards, we discuss the empirical implementation and link it to the
equality of opportunity literature.
6.1 The general case
Consider income and several non-income factors. We partition the set of non-income
factors f1; 2; : : : ; Jg in the set of non-controllable factors N = fjjj ! 0g (assumed
to be non-empty) and the set of partially controllable factors P = fjjj > 0g. The
rst-order conditions for the non-controllable factors in proposition 1 are equal to15P
k2N cov(xj ; xk)(tk k) = (1  t0)cov(xj ; y) +
P
k2P (k  tk)cov(xj ; xk); j 2 N: (7)
Suppose we have data for n individuals in a country on gross incomes and non-income
factors, collected in a n1 vector y, a njN j matrix XN for the non-controllable factors,
and a n jP j matrix XP for the partially controllable factors. All data are assumed to
be normalised (the mean is equal to zero). We can replace the population covariances
in (7) by their sample equivalents to obtain (in matrix notation)
(X 0NXN )(tN   N ) = (1  t0)X 0Ny +X 0NXP (P   tP );
with t0 = (t0N ; t
0
P ) and 
0 = (0N ; 
0
P ) collecting the tax rates and the willingness to pay
for the non-controllable and partially controllable factors. BecauseX 0NXN is invertible
the (non-controllable) factors are not perfectly correlated by assumption we get
tN = N + (1  t0)(X 0NXN ) 1X 0Ny| {z }
N0
+ (X 0NXN )
 1X 0NXP| {z }
NP
(P   tP ): (8)
The iconic term (X 0NXN )
 1X 0NZ is the linear projection of the non-controllable
factors on either gross income (if Z = y) or on the controllable factors (if Z = XP ). They
15Similar to equation (5), we use the fact that
cov(xj ; y) = (1  0)0j ;
for all j 2 N and similarly
cov(xj ; xk) = (1  k)kj ;
for all j 2 N and k 2 P .
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can be estimated in a multiple linear regression of income and the partially controllable
factors on the non-controllable factors, say
y = XNN0 + y; (9)
XP = XNNP + P : (10)
N0 is the jN j  1 slope vector with typical element j0 capturing the e¤ect of the
non-controllable factor j 2 N on gross income; NP is the jN j  jP j slope matrix with
typical element jk capturing the e¤ect of the non-controllable factor j 2 N on the
controllable factor k 2 P ; and y and P are a vector and matrix of i.i.d. error terms.
Equation (8) tells us that the tax rate on each non-controllable factor j 2 N (the
left-hand side) should be equal to the total expected e¤ect of the non-controllable factor
on well-being (the right-hand side). This total e¤ect can be split up in the direct e¤ect
of each factor on well-being (captured by N ) augmented by the sum of the indirect
expected e¤ects of each factor on well-being. This indirect expected e¤ect can run via
(1) net income (i.e., the expected e¤ect of a non-controllable factor on gross income,
captured by N0, multiplied by 1   t0 to obtain the net e¤ect on well-being) and via
(2) the partially controllable non-income factors (i.e., the expected e¤ect of a non-
controllable factor on a partially controllable factor, captured by NP , multiplied by
P   tP to obtain the net e¤ect on well-being).
6.2 Implementation
All variables in the equation system (8) are observable and therefore the system is test-
able in principle. Rather than obtaining separate estimates of the di¤erent parameters,
there is an easy direct way to put the theory to the test if one is willing to use happiness
data as a proxy for utility. In the appendix we derive the indirect utility function in
equation (19). It is (in vector notation) equal to
v = constant+ c+XNN +XPP ;
with v the n  1 vector of indirect utilities, c the n  1 vector of net incomes, and
constant a vector containing the same constant for each individual.
Suppose we have happiness data collected in a n 1 vector h as a proxy for utility.
We could specify a happiness regression
h = constant+ c+XNN +XPP + h;
17
with h a vector of error terms. We include a parameter  to capture the e¤ect of net
income on happiness; therefore, we also multiplied the direct e¤ects in  = (N ; P )
with  to keep their interpretation as the willingness to pay for the di¤erent non-income
factors. Let T be a vector containing the same demogrant for each individual. Net
income is in matrix notation equal to
c = (1  t0)y   T  XN tN  XP tP : (11)
Replacing net income c by (11) in the happiness equation and taking up T in the
constant the happiness equation becomes
h = constant+ (1  t0)y +XN(N   tN ) +XP(P   tP ) + h: (12)
Finally, using equations (9)-(10), we can rewrite the happiness equation as16
h = constant+XN[N   tN + (1  t0)N0 + NP (P   tP )] + : (13)
Recall equation (8). If the tax-benet scheme is e¢ cient and fair, then the term
between squared brackets in equation (13), the total e¤ect of non-controllable factors on
well-being, should be equal to zero. This provides us with a simple test. First, regress
happiness h on all non-controllable factors in XN , i.e.,
h = constant+XNN + ;
with N the slopes for the non-controllable factors. Second, test the joint hypothesis
that the slope vector N is equal to zero, and, in case it is rejected, test it separately
for the di¤erent factors. Irrespective of the test results, the estimated slope vector N
can provide valuable information about the total degree of compensation for di¤erent
non-controllable factors in di¤erent countries and di¤erent time periods.
Three nal comments are in order. First, the adopted responsibility cut at the be-
ginning of our paper is to keep individuals responsible for their preferences (tastes).
However, we end up here with regressions that belong to the rivalling control approach,
in which individuals are responsible for factors under control; see, e.g., Ramos and Van
de gaer (2012) and Roemer and Trannoy (2013) for overviews of the equality of oppor-
tunity literature. Two assumptions of the current model play a crucial role in reconciling
16The error term is  is dened as
 = h + (1  t0)y + P(P   tP ):
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both approaches and are therefore worth repeating: (1) the independence assumption
between unobserved abilities and tastes, and (2) the fact that optimal individual e¤ort
does not depend on ability. In this case, the two approaches coincide in our model.
Second, it is very likely that the tests will be rejected in many countries for many
factors. One explanation could be that societies are only willing to reduce the indirect
e¤ect of some non-controllable factors on well-being, but not the direct e¤ect, say, the
su¤ering caused by the factor.17 Or, societies may not fully grasp the complex correlation
structure of the di¤erent factors and disregard therefore some of the indirect e¤ects when
designing tax schemes. To further investigate such possibilities, one could
1. combine equations (9) and (11) to obtain the regression
c = constant+XN [(1  t0)N0   tN ] XP tP + : (14)
Regressing net income c onXN andXP allows therefore to test whether the indirect
e¤ects of the non-controllable factors via income are compensated.
2. combine equations (10) and (11) to obtain
c = constant+XN [ tN   NP tP ] + (1  t0)y + ; (15)
and thus regressing net income c on XN and y allows to test whether the in-
direct e¤ects of the non-controllable factors via the non-income factors are fully
compensated.
3. combine equations (9), (10), and (11) to obtain
c = constant+XN [(1  t0)N0   tN   NP tP ] + : (16)
Regressing net income c on XN allows to test whether all indirect e¤ects of the
non-controllable factors are fully compensated.
4. regress happiness h on y, XN , and XP as in equation (12) to test whether
tN = N , i.e., whether only the direct e¤ect of the tag is compensated.
This framework is related to the empirical approach to inequality of opportunity. In
this literature, practitioners distinguish between exogenous circumstances (XN in our
notation) and endogenous e¤ort (XP in our notation). Bourguignon et al. (2007) for
17 It could simply be too costly or even impossible to fully compensate for severe disabilities or pains.
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example, consider fathers and mothers education, fathers occupation, race, and region
of birth to be circumstances, while they assign (own) schooling attainment, migration,
and labour market status as e¤ort variables. The much discussed correlation between
circumstances and e¤ort in the empirical literature corresponds with the correlation
between non-controllable and controllable factors in our setting. In addition, the decom-
position into direct and indirect e¤ects resembles Bourguignon et al. (2007)s empirical
decomposition.
Third, estimating inequality of opportunity the relative share of total inequality
that can be attributed to circumstances typically starts from estimating equations
(9), (14), or (16) depending on the specic application. The empirical results for most
countries suggest that roughly a quarter to a third of income inequality can be attributed
to non-controllable factors; see, e.g., the results surveyed by Ramos and Van de gaer
(2012) and Roemer and Trannoy (2013). It has been acknowledged that these estimates
provide only lower bounds as researchers do not observe true ability nor (tastes for)
e¤ort; see, e.g., Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Niehues and Peichl (2013). In addition,
the resulting coe¢ cients cannot be interpreted as causal; see, e.g., Roemer and Trannoy
(2013, p. 81). A promising avenue for future research could combine the empirical
framework suggested here with identication strategies that exploit siblings correlations;
see, e.g., Björklund and Jäntti (2012).
7 Conclusion
Fairness plays a role in redistribution. Individuals want to compensate for misfortunes,
but also allow each other to enjoy the fruits of their e¤ort. Such fairness considerations
have been introduced in political economy and optimal income tax models. We introduce
fairness as a device to select among e¢ cient tax-benet schemes based on income and
non-income factors under partial control.
In general, optimal tax rates weigh the marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation caused by
tax distortions against the marginal net fairness benet of taxation. The latter combines
two e¤ects. The marginal compensation benet of taxation captures the fairness benet
that higher taxes reduce outcome di¤erences between individuals with the same tastes,
but di¤erent abilities. The marginal responsibility cost of taxation measures the fairness
cost that higher taxes also reduce the outcome di¤erences between individuals with the
same abilities, but di¤erent tastes.
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We also study two special cases in detail. In case only income is included in the
model, we show, among other things, that the optimal income tax negatively depends
on the degree of control over income and on the heterogeneity in abilities and tastes
in opposite ways. If we also add a tag to income, then the same conditions hold for
the optimal income tax while the optimal tax on the tag depends on its direct e¤ect on
well-being and on its correlation with the ability to earn income.
The theoretical analysis suggests lower taxes on income and higher taxes on non-
controllable non-income factors. While taxes on gender, age, and race are forbidden
de jure by anti-discrimination laws, many tax-benet schemes contain such taxes de
facto. For instance, most existing tax systems have at least some elements of (or even
complete) joint taxation. This punishes the secondary earner usually the wife with
higher marginal tax rates. Thus, it would be interesting to bring our theory to the data
and to investigate how existing tax systems (explicitly or implicitly) tax the various
factors.
While we also derive testable conditions for the general case and discuss the empirical
implementation, we leave the empirical estimation for future research. Several problems
arise, and any estimation will have to satisfactorily deal with these issues. Panel data
and xed e¤ects are preferably used to capture unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed e¤ects
estimation requires the non-controllable factors to vary over time. While this is probably
true for disability, it is not true for gender or parental background. Also factors like
age if included may be problematic as it is notoriously di¢ cult to disentangle cohort,
time, and age e¤ects; see, e.g., Deaton and Paxson (1994). It is a priori not clear,
however, whether age should be included at all in the analysis, e.g., if the goal is to look
at average life-cycle utility (see, e.g., Weinzierl, 2011). One must also be sure that the
included factors are non-controllable, which is not always easy to say, think, e.g., of being
an immigrant in a country. Even if these problems were solved, potential identication
problems remain. Bias caused by omitted variables, for example, is likely, as it is not
possible to observe true abilities and tastes. To tackle these issues, exploiting sibling
correlations might be a fruitful avenue.
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Principles underlying the social preference relation
We prove that the social preference relation satises the Pareto principle, compensation,
and responsibility. We start with the individual utility maximisation problem, being
max
e
U(c; x; e) = c+
PJ
j=1 jxj  
PJ
j=0
j
exp j
exp(
ej
j
)
subject to the following constraints
c  (1  t0)y   T  
PJ
j=1 tjxj ;
y = 0e0 + (1  0)0;
xj = jej + (1  j)j for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; J:
Dene 0 = 1. The J + 1 rst order conditions are
(j   tj)j  
1
exp j
exp(
ej
j
) = 0,
and lead to optimal e¤ort choices18
ej = j [ln(j   tj)j + j ] for all j = 0; 1; : : : ; J:
The corresponding gross income, non-income factors, and consumption are equal to
y = 0e0 + (1  0) 0
= 00[ln ((0   t0)0) + 0] + (1  0) 0; (17)
xj = je

j + (1  j) j
= jj [ln
  
j   tj

j

+ j ] + (1  j) j ; (18)
c = (0   t0)y   T  
PJ
j=1 tjx

j :
From now on we use (T; t) rather than  to refer to a tax scheme. Indirect utility is
denoted V (T; t; ; ) and is equal to
V (T; t; ; ) = c +
PJ
j=1 jx

j  
PJ
j=0
j
exp j
exp(
ej
j
);
= c +
PJ
j=1 jx

j  
PJ
j=0 j(j   tj)j ; (19)
=  T + (0   t0)y +
PJ
j=1(j   tj)xj  
PJ
j=0 j(j   tj)j ;
= (T; t) +
PJ
j=0(j   tj)jjj +
PJ
j=0(j   tj) (1  j) j ;
18Because tj < j must hold (for all j = 0; 1; : : : ; J) in the social optimum, the optimal e¤ort choices
are well-dened.
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with
(T; t) =  T +PJj=0(j   tj)jj [ln   j   tjj  1]: (20)
Well-being bv = v(T; t; ; ) follows from equating
V (T; t; ; ) = V (R0; 0; (bv; bv; : : : ; bv); );
leading to
v(T; t; ; ) =
(T; t)  (R0; 0) 
PJ
j=0 tjjjj +
PJ
j=0(j   tj) (1  j) jPJ
j=0 j (1  j)
: (21)
We are now ready to prove the properties of the social ranking. First of all, for each
taste vector , well-being v is a strictly increasing (a¢ ne) transformation of V . We
indeed have
v(T; t; ; ) = a() + b V (T; t; ; );
with
a() =
 (R0; 0) 
PJ
j=0 jjjjPJ
j=0 j (1  j)
and b =
1PJ
j=0 j (1  j)
> 0:
Because welfare is strictly increasing in well-being and well-being is strictly increasing in
indirect utility, the social preference relation satises the Pareto principle, i.e., a higher
utility for everyone (and strictly higher for at least one individual) implies a (strictly)
higher social welfare.
Second, the social welfare weight of an individual with type (; ) is equal to the
derivative of welfare w.r.t. well-being multiplied by the derivative of well-being w.r.t. in-
come. In the current setting, we obtain
exp( rv(T; t; ; ))R

R
 exp( rv(T; t; ; ))dF () dG ()
 b;
with  @v(T; t; ; )=@T = b the marginal well-being of income. The relative social wel-
fare weight of two individuals is thus inversely related to their well-being level. If two
individuals have the same tastes, then the one with the lower well-being level will get
priority, i.e., a transfer from the better o¤ to the worse o¤ if it were feasible improves
social welfare as required by the compensation principle. In the laisser-faire dened as
(T; t) = (R0; 0) individuals with the same abilities have the same well-being. Indeed,
we have
v(R0; 0; ; ) = v(R0; 0; ; 
0) =
PJ
j=0 j (1  j) jPJ
j=0 j (1  j)
;
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for all R0; ; ; 0. As a consequence, such individuals have the same social welfare
weight. If all individuals have the same abilities, then their social welfare weight is the
same in the laisser-faire. Any redistribution would be both ine¢ cient (distortive) and
inequality-increasing, thus the laisser-faire will be optimal as required by the responsib-
ility principle.
Proof of proposition 1
The planner chooses a tax scheme  to maximise
W () =  1[
R

R
(v(T; t; ; ))dF () dG ()]
subject to the budget constraint
R

R
(y
( ; ; ); x( ; ; ))dF () dG ()  R0:
We rewrite the budget constraint and the welfare function on the basis of the assumptions
made. For ease of exposition, we dene 0 = 1.
With linear taxes, the budget constraint is equal to
T +
R

R
(t0y
 +
PJ
j=1 tjx

j )dF () dG ()  R0;
with y, xj ; j = 1; 2; : : : ; J dened in equations (17)-(18) and F and G multivariate
normal distributions, with  and  the vector of means. Plugging in the di¤erent
expressions, we can rewrite the budget constraint as
T +
PJ
j=0 tjjj ln
  
j   tj

j

+
PJ
j=0 tj (1  j)j +
PJ
j=0 tjjj

j  R0:
Because e¢ ciency requires the budget constraint to be satised with equality, the lump-
sum tax T can be written as a function of the tax rates, i.e.,
T = R0  
PJ
j=0 tjjj ln
  
j   tj

j
 PJj=0 tj (1  j)j  PJj=0 tjjjj : (22)
Welfare is equal to
 1
r
ln[
R

R
 exp( rv(T; t; ; ))dF () dG ()];
with v dened in equation (21) and F and Gmultivariate normal distributions. Plugging
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in equation (21), welfare can be decomposed as W = A+B + C, with
A =
(T; t)  (R0; 0)

;
B =  1
r
ln[
R
 exp(
 rPJj=0(j   tj) (1  j) j

)dF ()];
C =  1
r
ln[
R
 exp(
r
PJ
j=0 tjjjj

)dG ()];
with  =
PJ
j=0 j (1  j) > 0 and  dened in equation (20). We rewrite the di¤erent
components A, B, and C.
Using equations (20) and (22), we directly get
A =
PJ
j=0 tjjj(1 + 

j ) +
PJ
j=0 tj (1  j)j +
PJ
j=0 jjj ln
j tj
j

:
To rewrite B and C, note that the moment-generating function of a normally distributed
x  N [;] is equal toZ
exp(
PJ
j=0 ajxj)dH(x) = exp[
PJ
j=0 ajj +
1
2
PJ
i=0
PJ
j=0 aiajij ]:
We get
B =
PJ
j=0
(j   tj) (1  j)j

  r
PJ
i=0
PJ
j=0(i   ti) (1  i) (j   tj) (1  j)ij
22
;
C =  PJj=0 tjjj j   r
PJ
i=0
PJ
j=0 tiiitjjj

ij
22
:
WelfareW = A+B+C is a function of tax rates t = (t0; t1; : : : ; tJ) only. Maximising
welfare leads to a system of rst-order conditions of the form @W@tj =
@A
@tj
+ @B@tj +
@C
@tj
= 0,
with19
@A
@tj
=
 jjjj tj + jj

1 + j

+ (1  j)j

;
@B
@tj
=  (1  j)

j

+
r (1  j)
PJ
k=0 (k   tk) (1  k)kj
2
;
@C
@tj
=  jj

j

  rjj
PJ
k=0 tkkk

kj
2
:
Putting everything together we obtain
jj
tj
j   tj
= rf1  j

PJ
k=0(k   tk)(1  k)kj  
jj

PJ
k=0 tkkk

kjg;
for each j = 0; 1; : : : ; J , as required.
19The double sums in B and C are of the generic form
PJ
i=0
PJ
j=0 'i(ti)'j(tj)ij , and its partial
derivative with respect to tj is equal to 2
@'j(tj)
@tj
PJ
k=0 'k(tk)kj :
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Proof of proposition 2
If only income matters, then the rst-order condition is
 (1  0)00 t0
1  t0   r(00)
2t0

00 + r(1  0)2(1  t0)00 = 0: (23)
The proof of proposition 2 turns out to be a special case of proposition 3 (point 1). We
will come back to it in the next section.
Proof of proposition 3
Suppose there are two variables, income y and an exogenous tag x1 (thus, 1 ! 0). The
rst-order conditions reduce to
 00 t0
1  t0   r (00)
2 t0

00 + r (1  0)

(1  t0) (1  0)00 + (1   t1)10

= 0;
(1  t0) (1  0)01 + (1   t1)11 = 0;
with  = 1  0 + 1 > 0. The second rst-order condition requires
t1 = 1 + (1  t0) (1  0)
01
11
; (24)
which can be plugged in in the rst condition, to get
 (1  0 + 1)| {z }
>0
00
t0
1  t0   r (00)
2 t0

00 + r (1  0)2 (1  t0) (00  (01)2=11) = 0:
(25)
Note three things. First, equation (25) does not depend on t1 and therefore com-
pletely describes the solution for income tax rate t0. Second, the term (00 (01)2=11)
is strictly positive because the squared correlation (01)
2=00

11 is assumed to be strictly
smaller than 1. Third, if the tag has no direct e¤ect (1 = 0) or indirect e¤ect (

01 = 0)
on well-being, then equation (25) reduces to equation (23); therefore proposition 3 also
proves proposition 2 as a special case.
Point 1. The optimal tax rate t0 on income satises the properties mentioned in pro-
position 2 (we call them points 1.1-1.6 in the sequel).
point 1.1. The optimal tax rate t0 on income lies in between the extremes of no taxation
and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t0 < 1.
If t0  0 in the optimum, then the left-hand side of equation (25) is strictly positive
and the rst-order condition cannot be satised; so t1 > 0 must hold at the optimum. If
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t0 approaches 1, then t01 t0 approaches +1, the left-hand side of equation (25) becomes
strictly negative, and the rst-order condition cannot be satised; so also t0 < 1 must
hold at the optimum.
point 1.2. The optimal tax rate t0 on income decreases with the elasticity 0, ranging
from complete taxation in the case of perfectly inelastic e¤ort (t0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no
taxation in the case of perfectly elastic e¤ort (t0 ! 0 if 0 ! +1).
If 0 ! 0, then the rst-order condition reduces to
r (1  0)2 (1  t0) (00   (01)2=11) = 0;
which is satised i¤ t0 ! 1. If 0 ! +1, then rst divide both sides of equation (25)
by (0)
2 > 0 and consider the limiting case 0 ! +1 to get
 r (0)2 t000 = 0;
which is satised i¤ t0 ! 0. The comparative statics show that taxes decrease with 0,
because
dt0
d0
=  
@(25)
@0
@(25)
@t0
=    0
t0
1 t0   2r0 (0)
2 t0

00
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
;
is negative indeed, given 0 < t0 < 1 in the optimum.
point 1.3. The optimal tax rate t0 on income increases with the inequality aversion r,
ranging from no taxation if the planner is inequality neutral (t0 ! 0 if r ! 0) to partial
taxation if the planner only cares about inequality (0 < t0 < 1 if r ! +1).
If r ! 0, then equation (25) reduces to
 00 t0
1  t0 = 0;
which implies t0 ! 0. To investigate the case r ! +1, divide rst both sides of (25)
by r > 0, take the limit r ! +1, and solve for t0 to obtain
t0 =
(1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
(00)
2 00 + (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
,
which will typically result in partial taxation. The comparative statics are given by
dt0
dr
=  
@(25)
@r
@(25)
@t0
=     (00)
2 t0

00 + (1  0)2 (1  t0) (00   (01)2=11)
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
:
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We can rewrite the numerator, using equation (25), to obtain
dt0
dr
=   00
t0
1 t0
1
r
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
;
which is positive, indeed, given 0 < t0 < 1 in the optimum.
point 1.4. The optimal tax rate t0 on income increases with ability heterogeneity 00,
ranging from no taxation if everyone has the same ability (t0 ! 0 if 00 ! 0) to complete
taxation if ability becomes extremely heterogeneous (t0 ! 1 if 00 ! +1).
If 00 ! 0 (and thus also 01 ! 0), then equation (25) reduces to
 (1  0 + 1)00
t0
1  t0   r (00)
2 t0

00 = 0
which leads to t0 ! 0. If 00 ! +1, then divide rst both sides of (25) by 00 > 0,
take the limit 00 ! +1, and equation (25) reduces to
r (1  0)2 (1  t0) = 0;
which implies t0 ! 1. The comparative statics for t0 w.r.t. 00 are equal to
dt0
d00
=  
@(25)
@00
@(25)
@t0
=   r (1  0)
2 (1  t0)
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
;
which is positive, given 0 < t0 < 1 in the optimum.
point 1.5. The optimal tax rate t0 on income decreases with taste heterogeneity 

00,
ranging from partial taxation if everyone has the same taste (0 < t0 < 1 if 

00 ! 0) to
zero taxation if taste becomes extremely heterogeneous (t0 ! 0 if 00 ! +1).
If 00 ! 0, then equation (25) reduces to
 00 t0
1  t0 + r (1  0)
2 (1  t0) (00   (01)2=11) = 0;
which can lead to any tax rate in between 0 and 1. If 00 ! +1, then divide rst both
sides of (25) by 00 > 0, take the limit 

00 ! +1, and equation (25) reduces to
 r (00)2 t0 = 0;
which implies t0 ! 0. Comparative statics are given by
dt0
d00
=  
@(25)
@00
@(25)
@t0
=    r (00)
2 t0
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
;
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which is negative, as required.
point 1.6. The optimal tax rate t0 on income decreases with the degree of control 0,
ranging from complete taxation if income cannot be controlled (t0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no
taxation if income is fully controlled (t0 ! 0 if 0 ! 1).
If 0 ! 0, equation (25) reduces to
r (1  t0) (00   (01)2=11) = 0;
which implies t0 ! 1. If 0 ! 1, equation (25) reduces to
 0 1t0
1  t0   r (0)
2 t0

00 = 0;
which is satised i¤ t0 ! 0. The comparative statics for t0 w.r.t. 0 are given by
dt0
d0
=  
@eq(25)
@0
@eq(25)
@t0
=  (0   )0
t0
1 t0   2r(00)0t0

00   2r (1  0) (1  t0) (00   (01)2=11)
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
:
We can multiply the numerator and denominator by 0 = 0 (1  0 + 1) > 0 and use
equation (25) to replace 00
t0
1 t0 by r (00)
2 t0

00+r (1  0)2 (1  t0)00(1 
 
01
2
)
in the numerator, to obtain (after some manipulation)
dt0
d0
=  (0 + )r (00)
2 t0

00 + ( + 10)r (1  0) (1  t0) (00   (01)2=11)
0[
00
(1 t0)2 + r (00)
2 00 + r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)]
;
which is negative, given 0 < t0 < 1 in the optimum.
Point 2. The optimal tax rate t0 on income decreases with the direct e¤ect of the tag
on well-being 1.
The comparative statics for t0 w.r.t. 1 is given by
dt0
d1
=  
@eq(25)
@1
@eq(25)
@t0
=    00
t0
1 t0
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
;
which is negative, given 0 < t0 < 1 in the optimum.
Point 3. The optimal tax rate t0 on income follows an inverse U-shaped pattern with
respect to the covariance between the tag and earnings ability 01, starting and ending
at no taxation in case of perfect correlation (t0 ! 0 if (01)2 ! 0011) and reaching a
maximum in case of no correlation (01 = 0).
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First, note that in the case of perfect correlation ((01)
2 ! 0011) equation (25)
reduces to
00
t0
1  t0   r (00)
2 t0

00 = 0;
which indeed implies t0 ! 0. The comparative statics for t0 w.r.t. 01 are given by
dt0
d01
=  
@eq(25)
@01
@eq(25)
@t0
=    r (1  0)
2 (1  t0) 201=11
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
:
The sign of dt0=d01 is indeed inversely related to the sign of 

01, leading to an inverse
U-shaped pattern.
Point 4. The optimal tax rate t0 on income increases with 11.
The comparative statics for t0 w.r.t. 11 is given by
dt0
d11
=  
@eq(25)
@11
@eq(25)
@t0
=   r (1  0)
2 (1  t0) (01=11)2
  00
(1 t0)2   r (00)
2 00   r (1  0)2 (00   (01)2=11)
;
which is positive, given 0 < t0 < 1 in the optimum.
Proof of proposition 4
Point 1. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag will be larger (resp. smaller) than 1, if
the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative)
Using proposition 3 (point 1.1 in the proof) we must have 0 < t0 < 1. Using equation
(24), this implies indeed that t1 T 1 holds if 01 T 0.
Point 2. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with the income
elasticity 0 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative).
The comparative statics of t1 w.r.t. 0 are
dt1
d0
=
@eq(24)
@0| {z }
=0
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
d0
=   (1  0) 

01
11
dt0
d0
;
with dt0d0 negative at the optimum (see proposition 3, point 1.2 in the proof). The sign
of dt1d0 corresponds therefore with the sign of 

01.
Point 3. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag decreases (resp. increases) with ability
heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covariance 

01 is positive (resp. negative).
35
The comparative statics of t1 w.r.t. 00 are
dt1
d00
=
@eq(24)
@00| {z }
=0
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
d00
=   (1  0) 

01
11
dt0
d00
;
with dt0
d00
positive at the optimum (see proposition 3, point 1.4 in the proof). The sign
of dt1d0 is thus inversely related to the sign of 

01.
Point 4. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with taste
heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covariance 

01 is positive (resp. negative).
The comparative statics of t1 w.r.t. 

00 are
dt1
d00
=
@eq(24)
@00| {z }
=0
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
d00
=   (1  0) 

01
11
dt0
d00
;
with dt0
d00
negative at the optimum (see proposition 3, point 1.5 in the proof). The sign
of dt1
d00
corresponds therefore with the sign of 01.
Point 5. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag decreases (resp. increases) with the in-
equality aversion r if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative).
The comparative statics of t1 w.r.t. r are
dt1
dr
=
@eq(24)
@r| {z }
=0
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
dr
=   (1  0) 

01
11
dt0
dr
;
with dt0dr positive at the optimum (see proposition 3, point 1.3 in the proof). The sign of
dt1
dr is thus inversely related to the sign of 

01.
Point 6. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag is equal to 1 if there is no control over
income and if there is full control over income (t1 ! 1, if either 0 ! 0 or 0 ! 1);
the change of the tax rate with control is undened in general.
If 0 ! 0, then t0 ! 1 and if 0 ! 1, then t0 ! 0 (see proposition 3, point 1.6 in
the proof). In both cases we have (1  t0) (1  0) ! 0 and equation (24) tells us that
t1 ! 1. The comparative statics for t1 w.r.t. 0 are
dt1
d0
=
@eq(24)
@0
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
d0
=  (1  t0)

1 +
1  0
1  t0
dt0
d0

01
11
;
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with dt0d0 negative (see proposition 3, point 1.6 in the proof). The sign of
dt1
d0
is not
dened in general.
Point 7. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag increases with 01.
The comparative statics for t1 w.r.t. 01 are
dt1
d01
=
@eq(24)
@01
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
d01
=
(1  t0) (1  0)
11
  (1  0) 

01
11
dt0
d01
;
with the sign of dt0
d01
being inversely related to the sign of 01 (see proposition 3, point
3), thus 

01dt0
d01
must be negative. Using 0 < t0 < 1 at the optimum (see proposition 3,
point 1.1 in the proof) we obtain that dt1
d01
is positive.
Point 8. The optimal tax rate t1 on the tag decreases (resp. increases) with 11 if the
covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative).
The comparative statics for t1 w.r.t. 11 are
dt1
d11
=
@eq(24)
@11
+
@eq(24)
@t0
dt0
d11
=  01[
(1  t0) (1  0)
(11)
2
+
1  0
11
dt0
d11
];
with the sign of dt0
d11
being positive (see proposition 3, point 4). The term between
squared brackets is positive, and the sign of dt1
d11
is inversely related to the sign of 01.
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